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The 2017 general election took place in the shadow of the vote for Brexit. 
Somewhat unusually, both Labour and the Conservatives made a pitch to 
lower income groups. On one side, the Conservatives made a bold play to 
appeal to many lower income voters’ support for Brexit and immigration 
control. On the other, Jeremy Corbyn and Labour instead sought to appeal 
to these voters’ economic concerns over living standards, redistribution, 
inequality and austerity. But how did these voters on lower incomes, and 
those at risk of or in poverty, vote at the election?  
Actions / What you need to know  
• Many voters who are struggling to get by and marginalized may agree with the vote for Brexit and 
calls to curb immigration, but were more likely to vote for Labour because of their desire for 
economic redistribution and to endorse Labour’s anti-austerity platform.  
• Labour’s pitch to low income voters, and those in poverty, was a key driver of its performance at the 
2017 election, but no political party made a major and clear breakthrough with these groups.  
• Both of the main parties, therefore, would be well advised to take the economic concerns of these 
key groups seriously and to keep them as much on the centre stage of British politics as possible. 
 
 
 
We can solve UK poverty 
JRF is working with governments, businesses, communities, charities and individuals to solve UK poverty. 
The UK 2017 General Election examined: income, poverty and Brexit plays an important part in 
examining why those who are struggling need to be centre stage in UK politics – a key focus of our 
strategy to solve UK poverty. 
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Executive summary   
Key points 
The 2017 general election took place in the shadow of the vote for Brexit. It also presented 
more marginalised sections of British society – voters on low incomes, those in poverty and who 
are struggling to get by - with a far more meaningful choice than that seen at previous elections. 
Somewhat unusually, both Labour and the Conservatives made a pitch to lower income groups. 
On one side, the Conservatives made a bold play to appeal to many lower income voters’ support 
for Brexit and immigration control. On the other, Jeremy Corbyn and Labour instead sought to 
appeal to these voters’ economic concerns over living standards, redistribution, inequality and 
austerity. But how did these voters on lower incomes, and those at risk of or in poverty, vote at 
the election?  
 
Key findings: 
1. People on low incomes are still more likely to vote for the Labour party than for the 
Conservative party: 42% of them voted for Labour, compared to 37% who voted for the 
Conservatives. But both parties increased their support among low income voters compared 
to 2015 (by about eight percentage points each), although neither party made a dramatic 
breakthrough at the expense of the other.  By contrast, high income voters remained much 
more likely to vote Conservative than Labour: 53% compared to 24%.  
 
2. While the Conservative Party’s hard vision of Brexit attracted some low income voters, 
Labour’s radical left-wing anti-austerity vision attracted them much more. To have the 
best of both worlds people on low incomes would probably favour a party that offered them 
both redistribution and control of immigration, but given the choice at the 2017 election 
their preference for redistribution outweighed their preference for immigration control. 
Other things being equal, support for Labour among people on low incomes with left-wing 
economic views was 66% compared to just 23% for the Conservatives – handing Labour a 
lead of over 40 percentage points. By contrast, support for Labour among people on low 
incomes but who are pro-Brexit was 32% compared to 54% for the Conservatives – a 
Conservative lead of 22 percentage points.  
 
3. Some of the most substantial advances by the Conservative Party came in struggling 
non-metropolitan, pro-Brexit and Labour-held areas but the Conservative Party did 
not make sufficient progress in these areas to push seats from the red into the blue 
column. Of an estimated 140 Labour seats in England that had given majority support to 
Brexit the average Conservative vote increased by 8.3 percentage points, compared to an 
average of 4.6 points across England as a whole. Yet Labour contained this advance, even 
capturing more than a dozen seats from the Conservatives that are estimated to have voted 
for Brexit. 
 
4. People who thought that their household’s financial situation had got worse during the 
year before the election were considerably more likely to back Labour than the 
Conservatives (48% vs. 27%). In contrast, those who thought that their financial situation 
had got better – of which there were relatively few (just 13% thought this) - were more 
likely to vote Conservative than Labour (52% vs. 29%). With inflation rising, wages stagnant 
and low rates of growth this is an ominous finding for the Conservative Party.  
 
5. People’s political preferences are not only shaped by their own personal financial 
circumstances, but also by the surrounding conditions of the communities in which 
they live. The effect on the likelihood of voting Conservative of living in an area with a high 
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or low proportion of people at risk of working age poverty was similar in scale to the effect 
of having a high or low income personally.  These sharp differences will continue to impact 
upon British politics. 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that while many voters on low incomes agreed with the vote for 
Brexit, and still favour reductions in immigration, at the 2017 election they were relatively more 
likely to vote for Labour because of their desire for improved living standards and to oppose 
austerity. This suggests that Labour’s pitch to low income voters and those in poverty was a key 
driver of its unexpectedly strong performance at the 2017 election. It also suggests, more 
generally, that the main parties should take more notice of the economic concerns of these 
voters and keep them as much on the centre stage of British politics as possible. 
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1 The pitch to low income voters 
How did people on low incomes and at risk of poverty vote at the 2017 general election? How 
do these voting patterns compare to those at the 2016 referendum on Britain’s EU membership 
– a vote that cut across traditional party allegiances? And, in the shadow of the post-2008 
financial crisis, what might these patterns tell us about the political views and priorities of people 
on low incomes?  
The 2017 general election took place amid a wider context of austerity in which a freeze on 
working-age benefits and tax credit, stagnant wages, a return to inflation and the rising cost of 
living, have introduced new risks for people and families struggling on low incomes, or who are 
already in poverty (JRF, 2017). The election also took place in the aftermath of the 2016 vote 
for Brexit. As our past research with JRF has shown, people who struggle on low incomes and 
have few or no qualifications tended to vote for Brexit (Heath and Goodwin, 2016b).  
This work also pointed to the importance of place, with voters who reside in ‘low skill areas’ 
significantly more likely to vote for Brexit. That such groups, alongside pensioners, were key to 
Brexit has since been confirmed by others, who show that voters who struggle financially and 
feel ‘left behind’ were the most likely to play down the perceived economic risks of Brexit ahead 
of the vote (Clarke et al, 2017; Curtice, 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015; NatCen, 2016). 
Exploring how these same groups voted at the 2017 general election is an important task. Did 
these concerns about immigration and Brexit over-ride their more traditional concerns about 
low incomes and economic inequality within the context of austerity? Or did these concerns 
about economic inequality persist? And what do the answers to these questions reveal about the 
policy priorities of these voters? 
These questions are all the more intriguing given the context of the 2017 election. Unlike in the 
past, when the concerns of these voters were more marginalized in Britain’s political debate 
(Evans and Tilley, 2017), people on lower incomes were far more central to the national 
conversation. After decades when general elections had provided people with echoes rather than 
choices, the 2017 election offered people a more meaningful choice. The Conservative Party 
gambled that it could convert support for Brexit among these groups into major gains at the 
election, including capturing some of the nearly 70% of Labour-held seats that had given 
majority support to Brexit (Hanretty, 2016). The party called on such voters to ensure the 
delivery of Brexit and endorse Prime Minister May’s ‘Lancaster House’ vision of Brexit, which 
included leaving the single market, the customs union and ending the free movement of EU 
nationals.  
Theresa May downplayed David Cameron’s more liberal conservatism in favour of trying to win 
over the working-class and ‘ordinary working families’ (the ‘OWFs’). This was partly about 
winning back Conservative voters who had defected to UKIP but also financially struggling voters 
in Labour-held seats who had voted for Brexit. The strategy was reflected in promises to cap 
energy prices, increase the national living wage, talk of developing a new industrial strategy, 
support for grammar schools and criticism of the ‘citizens of nowhere’ and ‘liberal elite’. One of 
May’s chief advisors (Nick Timothy) would later elaborate on this strategy, urging his party to go 
much further in tackling declining social mobility, a real term decline in average wages, rising 
intergenerational inequality, corporate irresponsibility and tax evasion. May’s brand of ‘post-
liberal conservatism’ was thus seen by its advocates as different from a libertarian tradition that 
had dominated the party in earlier years, and also Cameron’s more socially liberal conservatism.i 
Under Jeremy Corbyn, meanwhile, Labour sought to offer a more radical left-wing platform that 
was rooted in the party’s traditional calls for a fairer redistribution of economic growth, to tackle 
poverty, advance social justice and oppose austerity. Revealingly, the Labour manifesto cited 
poverty sixteen times, while the Conservative manifesto only mentioned it nine times, and usually 
in relation to pensioners or international aid. Labour also made a wider pitch to voters on middle 
and lower incomes. They promised to only increase income taxes on people earning over 
£80,000 a year, introduce new workplace protections and rights, and take water, the Royal Mail, 
railways and energy back into public ownership. They made specific references to helping families 
in fuel poverty, investing in infrastructure, bolstering spending on public services, including 
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childcare and the NHS, and abolishing university tuition fees. 
Labour made other offers to those on low incomes, although some have argued that their policy 
offer did not fully match up to their rhetorical commitments.ii The party did promise to scrap a 
‘punitive’ sanctions regime; abolish the spare room subsidy (the ‘Bedroom Tax’); reinstate housing 
benefit for people aged under 21-years old; and scrap cuts to Bereavement Support Payments. 
They also opposed cuts to work allowances in Universal Credit (UC) and the decision to limit tax 
credit and UC payments to the first two children in a family. They promised a new Child Poverty 
Strategy aimed at the nearly four million children currently living in poverty; a Social Security Bill 
that would increase Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), and increased allowances for 
carers. They promised to scrap the Work Capability and Personal Independence Payment 
assessments; and commission a report into expanding the Access to Work programme. Labour 
also devoted specific attention to outlining its stance on disabled people, an estimated 4.2 million 
of who live in poverty. These policies were wrapped in calls to work for ‘the many, not the few’.  
Given this pitch from Labour and the Conservatives, how did people on low-incomes and groups 
at risk of poverty navigate this choice, with the Conservative Party appealing more to their 
identity-related concerns over immigration, belonging and community, which had been central 
to the Brexit vote, and Labour appealing more to their economic concerns over jobs, incomes, 
inequality and redistribution? Faced with these contrasting appeals, did they split their vote 
evenly between the two parties? Or did the anti-austerity message resonate more with some 
groups of struggling voters and the anti-immigration message resonate more with others? These 
are the questions that we will explore. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
   5 
 
2 The dynamics of the 2017 vote 
Much of what we know about the dynamics of the 2017 general election comes from analysis at 
the ‘aggregate level’, examining the relationship between the characteristics of areas and how 
they voted, as opposed to examining actual individual voters. We will first examine the dynamics 
of the 2017 vote at the aggregate-level before turning to look at the individual voters who 
participated in the British Election Study Internet Panel. 
We can start by exploring turnout. Contrary to talk in earlier years about a worrying spread of 
political apathy (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones, 2006), turnout at the 2017 general election reached 
almost 69%, the highest since 1997 and another high after the 72% rate of turnout that was 
recorded at the 2016 referendum. Compared to the previous election in 2015, turnout tended 
to increase the most in seats that tended to be more affluent, had large proportions of young 
people, graduates, ethnic minorities, and which had voted to remain in the EU.  
Because turnout increased in many younger areas, which often had large numbers of students, 
many commentators talked about a ‘Youthquake’. Of the 20 constituencies in England with the 
highest concentration of 18-29 year olds, turnout increased by an average of 4.6 percentage 
points but of the 20 seats with the lowest proportion of young people, turnout increased by just 
2.6 points. Thus, even though ‘older’ seats still tended to record higher turnout, in 2017 it was 
often younger seats that recorded the sharpest increase in turnout on the previous election in 
2015. Though London attracted much of the attention it would be a mistake to assume that 
these sharp increases in turnout were only recorded in the capital. In fact, of the 50 seats that 
recorded the sharpest increase in turnout only 14 were in London. The tremors of the 
Youthquake were felt further afield in seats like Canterbury, Cambridge, Manchester Withington, 
and the City of Chester. 
Turnout also tended to increase in pro-Remain areas. Of the 20 seats in England and Wales 
which registered the highest support for Brexit, turnout in 2017 increased by an average of just 
1.6 percentage points, while across the 20 seats that registered the strongest support for 
Remain turnout increased by an average of almost 6 points. This provides some evidence of a 
backlash among some voters against the vote for Brexit. 
These increases in turnout tended to hurt the Conservatives. Across the 20 seats that saw the 
sharpest increases in turnout the average Labour vote increased by 12.6 percentage points while 
the average Conservative vote increased by only 0.8 points. Seen through a wider lens, across 
the 50 seats that saw the sharpest increases in turnout the average Labour vote increased by 12 
points while the average Conservative vote increased by only 3.2 points. In fact, of the 50 seats 
that recorded the largest increase in turnout Labour hold all but nine. Such statistics reveal how 
Corbyn and Labour did have some success in bringing new voters into the polling stations to 
support their platform. 
How did the main parties tend to perform in different types of areas? Compared to 2015, the 
Conservative Party was more likely to increase its vote in seats where average education levels 
were low and there are larger proportions of older and white voters. Of the 20 seats with the 
largest proportion of pensioners the Conservative Party vote increased by 7.6 percentage points 
while Labour’s increased by almost 9 points. Yet in the 20 seats with the lowest proportion of 
pensioners the Conservative vote declined by 2.4 points while Labour’s vote surged by 12. The 
Conservatives also tended to perform better in seats with larger proportions of citizens with no 
qualifications. In the 20 seats with the largest proportion of voters with no qualifications the 
Conservative vote increased by 11 points while the Labour vote was up by almost 8 points. Yet in 
the 20 seats with the lowest proportion of voters with no qualifications the Conservative vote 
fell by -4.7 points while Labour’s increased by 10 points. 
There are also striking patterns regarding ethnicity. In the 20 most ethnically diverse seats (i.e. 
with the largest proportion of ‘non-white’ voters), compared to 2015 the Conservative vote 
declined by 0.5 points while Labour’s vote increased by 10 points. In sharp contrast, in the 20 
seats with the lowest non-white populations the Conservative vote increased by an average of 
8.6 points while the Labour vote increased by an average of 8.5 points. 
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Linked to these findings is the fact that the Conservatives also made gains in seats where the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) had previously been strong. There is a strong correlation between a 
collapse of support for UKIP and an increase of support for the Conservatives – a pattern that 
was especially marked in low-skill areas that are characterized by larger numbers of working-
class residents and people with few or no qualifications. Across 20 seats that had given UKIP its 
strongest support in 2015, UKIP lost support in all of them, losing an average of 21 points. This 
pattern was especially visible in struggling seats in East England, such as Boston and Skegness, 
Castle Point and Clacton, as well as more northern Labour-held areas like Heywood and 
Middleton, Wentworth and Dearne, Stoke-on-Trent North and Don Valley. In such seats, 
compared to 2015 UKIP’s vote fell by at least 20 points while the Conservative vote surged by at 
least 15 points, revealing how Theresa May’s strategy of appealing to these areas did have some 
success (although as we note below, it was also somewhat limited).  
Looking ahead to the next election, therefore, the Conservatives may be inclined to target pro-
Brexit, working-class and currently Labour-held seats where Labour MPs are on small majorities, 
such as Dudley North, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Crewe and Nantwich, Barrow and Furness, and 
Ashfield. Labour, in contrast, may be inclined to work on ways to defend this territory while also 
targeting more pro-Remain and younger Conservative-held seats with small majorities, such as 
Pudsey, Chipping Barnet, Hendon, Finchley and Golders Green, or Putney.  
Another important factor that underpins voting patterns is the difference between more urban 
and densely populated areas of the country versus more rural and less populated seats. This 
‘urban-periphery’ divide is attracting more attention among researchers. In the UK, some 
researchers point to these geographical divides between ‘citizens residing in locations strongly 
connected to global growth and those who are not’ (Jennings and Stoker, 2017), a dynamic that 
is also attracting attention in the United States where both Obama and Clinton tended to poll 
strongly in more densely populated areas while struggling in less metropolitan districts (Scala and 
Johnson, 2017).  
In 2017, Labour did tend to make gains in more densely-populated seats. Labour made gains in 
large parts of London but also in urban seats outside of the capital, such as Portsmouth South, 
Bristol West, Leicester South, Nottingham East and Cardiff Central. The story, however, is rather 
different in the least densely populated seats. Some of the most substantial advances by the 
Conservative Party came in struggling non-metropolitan areas like Bolsover, Boston and 
Skegness, Don Valley, Rother Valley, Ashfield and Mansfield. Such patterns reflect a growing 
divide not only in the life experiences of people in urban versus periphery areas but also in their 
voting patterns.  
Linked to this is the Conservative Party’s performance in pro-Brexit and Labour-held seats. The 
Conservatives did make gains in a large swathe of pro-Brexit Labour territory. Each of the six 
Labour seats that were captured by the Conservatives were estimated to have voted for Brexit. 
In traditional Labour seats like Rother Valley, held by Labour since 1918, the Conservative vote 
increased by more than 17 points. This was emblematic of a wider pattern of the Conservatives 
making gains in often traditional Labour seats that had also backed Brexit, such as Ashfield, 
Heywood and Middleton, Stoke-on-Trent North, Burnley, Stoke-on-Trent Central, Redcar, 
Chesterfield, Don Valley, Wentworth and Dearne and Bolsover – where the Conservative vote 
increased by at least 16 percentage points. 
In fact, across an estimated 140 Labour seats in England that had given majority support to 
Brexit the average Conservative vote increased by 8.3 percentage points, compared to an 
average of 4.6 points across England as a whole. This advance was even more striking in the most 
strongly pro-Brexit Labour seats. In an estimated 71 Labour seats in England where at least 60% 
of people had voted to leave the EU, the Conservative vote surged by more than 11 percentage 
points, once again suggesting that the party was more appealing to voters in these areas than it 
had been in 2015 and prior to the vote for Brexit. 
However, the Conservative Party did not make sufficient progress in these Labour areas to push 
seats from the red and into the blue column. That the ‘Brexit effect’ was not clear-cut was 
reflected in the fact that Labour captured seventeen seats from the Conservatives that were 
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estimated to have backed Brexit, revealing how Labour’s offensive was not solely concentrated in 
strongly pro-Remain seats.iii Labour more generally did not suffer a collapse of support in pro-
Brexit seats, which some Conservative strategists had anticipated.  
In summary, Labour tended to advance in areas of the country with larger numbers of 18-40 
year olds, graduates, that were more ethnically diverse, and also where, since 2015, support for 
the Greens and Liberal Democrats had declined. In contrast, the Conservative Party was more 
likely to advance in seats where average education levels were low and there are larger 
proportions of older and white voters. Thus, the social and political factors that were most 
strongly associated with the vote for Brexit were also most strongly associated with changes in 
support for the main parties, although it is important to note that some shifts predated the vote 
for Brexit (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). 
In this respect, one of the most important long term trends that has reshaped the structure of 
political battles in Britain concerns class. Put simply, over the last forty years or so class has 
become far less politically salient, and the difference between the working class who traditionally 
supported Labour and the middle class who traditionally supported the Conservatives has 
narrowed. In the 1960s, support for Labour was some 40 points higher among the working class 
than the middle class. By the 2010s this gap had narrowed to less than 20 points (Heath, 2015; 
Evans and Tilley, 2012, 2017). As Labour, in particular, became a more ‘middle class’ party, 
turnout among the working class declined relatively steeply (Heath, 2016).   
In addition working class voters have become more likely to vote for parties other than Labour. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of working class voters who supported Labour, the 
Conservatives, or another party in each election since 1964 using British Election Study face-
to-face data. Broadly speaking, when Labour has won elections, it has tended to do so by 
securing a majority of the votes from the working class. From 1964 to the mid-1970s (when 
Labour won three out of four elections) working class voters were much more likely to vote 
Labour than Conservative (by around 30 to 40 percentage points). In the Thatcher era these 
divisions narrowed somewhat to around 15 percentage points, with the Conservatives gaining 
over 30% of the working class vote. However, with the re-election of Labour under Tony Blair, 
Labour once again enjoyed a majority of working class support, with over 60% of working class 
voters supporting Labour in the 1997 and 2001 elections (though it should be noted that 
Labour enjoyed a substantial advantage among all class groups during this period, including the 
middle class). Although since 2005 Labour support among the working class has declined 
somewhat, as recently as 2010 the party still enjoyed a 20-point lead over the Conservatives.  
In 2015, however, and for the first time, Labour’s lead among working class voters disappeared. 
The working classes were relatively evenly split between Labour and the Conservatives, while the 
insurgent UKIP in England and SNP in Scotland made huge inroads into working class support, 
securing nearly 30% of the vote between them. With the collapse of UKIP in 2017, a large 
number of working class votes were therefore up for grabs. And as we have already outlined, 
somewhat unusually both of the two main parties made a concerted pitch for their votes. In the 
following sections we examine where these working-class voters went and why. 
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Figure 1: Voting behaviour of working class voters, 1964-2015 
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3 Poverty, income and the 2017 election 
In order to explore how people voted at the 2017 election we can use new individual-level data 
from the British Election Study Internet panel.iv While an online survey is not as methodologically 
rigorous as face-to-face random probability surveys, the estimate of party vote shares were 
reasonably close to the election result. The survey is also helpful because the questionnaire on 
which it is based probes a wide range of topics, including attitudes toward austerity, immigration, 
Brexit, social and political values, and people’s backgrounds. We can start by comparing how 
support for the Conservatives and Labour varied among different groups.  
Our past research on the 2016 referendum (Goodwin and Heath, 2016) showed that large 
proportions of the working class, people on low incomes and those with few educational 
qualifications, voted for Brexit. While the vote for Brexit was 52% across the entire country it 
reached an average level of 75% among voters with no qualifications, 71% among routine manual 
workers, 59% among those not in paid work and 58% among those in households with an income 
of less than £20,000 per year. This work also pointed to the importance of place, with voters 
who reside in low skill areas being significantly more likely to turnout for Brexit.v  
Yet compared to the referendum, in this election these social divides were not quite so clear-cut, 
and there was certainly not a dramatic realignment along the lines that had been important in 
the referendum. Figure 2 shows how, in 2017, people on low incomes were marginally more 
likely to vote Labour than Conservative. For people on incomes of less than £20,000 per year, 
average support for Labour was 42% compared to 37% for the Conservatives, a difference of five 
percentage points. By contrast, people on high incomes were much more likely to vote 
Conservative than Labour: average support for the Conservatives among people with incomes of 
more than £60,000 per year was 53%, compared to 24% for Labour, a difference of 29 points.  
Compared to the 2015 election, both parties managed to increase their level of support among 
people on low incomes, by roughly similar amounts (about 8 percentage points each). So even 
though both parties succeeded in making inroads, neither party made a dramatic breakthrough at 
the expense of the other.  
We can also probe other indicators of poverty. People who are unemployed were far more likely 
to vote Labour than Conservative (53% vs. 23%), though there was not much of a difference in 
support between those working full-time (42% vs. 36%). Retired people were much more likely to 
vote Conservative than Labour (53% vs. 27%). People of working age were more likely to vote 
Labour than Conservative (44% vs 34%). Data on occupational background is still being coded, so 
we have to be cautious in terms of how we interpret the results – but based on the data that we 
do have, those who work in routine manual occupations were evenly split between Labour and 
Conservatives (38% vs. 38%) whereas those in higher professional occupations were somewhat 
more likely to vote Conservative than Labour (40% vs. 34%).vi There is, therefore, not much 
evidence of a class divide in party support. A similar picture also emerges with respect to the 
market research social grade classifications, which is a somewhat crude measure of social class. 
This indicates that the middle class (AB) were somewhat more likely to vote Conservative than 
Labour (42% vs. 35%), whereas the working class (DE) were somewhat less likely to vote 
Conservative than Labour (36% vs 43%). Overall though it appears likely that in 2017 the 
Conservative Party attracted a record level of support among the working-class.  
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Figure 2: Party support among different demographic sub-groups 
 
We can drill down further by exploring differences in people’s subjective experiences of 
economic well-being (see Table 1). With respect to people’s living conditions, people who 
thought that their household’s financial situation had got worse during the previous year were 
considerably more likely to back Labour than the Conservatives (48% vs. 27%). In contrast, those 
who thought that their financial situation had got better – of whom there were relatively few 
(just 13% thought this) - were more likely to vote Conservative than Labour (52% vs. 29%). 
Similarly, people who thought that the general economic situation of the country had got worse 
over the previous year, of whom there were many (61%) were more likely to vote for Labour 
than the Conservatives (49% vs. 26%). And the small number of voters (just over 10%) who felt 
that Britain’s economic situation had got better were overwhelmingly more likely to vote 
Conservative (80% vs. 10%).  
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Table 1 Economic evaluations and party support, row percentages 
  Conservative  Labour  Other  Total 
Household 
economy got 
worse 
27  48  25  39 
Household 
economy got 
better 
52  29  19  13 
National 
economy got 
worse 
26  49  26  61 
National 
economy got 
better 
80  10  9  11 
 
These differences relating to income and the economy are important but they were not the only 
differences to be recorded. Women were somewhat more likely to vote Labour than 
Conservatives (42% vs. 38%) whereas men were more likely to vote Conservative by around 
seven points (42% vs. 35%). Support for Labour was also higher – by 36 percentage points – 
among voters from Black and minority ethnic backgrounds (BAME) than among white British. 
Whereas 61% of people from a BAME background voted Labour, just 25% gave their vote to the 
Conservatives.  
Also striking were differences in levels of support for the main parties across different age 
cohorts. Support for the Conservatives among pensioners was some 40 percentage points 
greater than support among people aged 18-24 years old, whereas support for Labour was 37 
percentage points greater among the young than the old. These pronounced age differences are 
of similar magnitude to those that we observed in the EU referendum and underscore how age 
has become an important factor to explaining voting in Britain. They are also somewhat greater 
than observed in 2015, perhaps reflecting the Conservative’s success at capturing former 
(typically older) UKIP voters (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). 
Lastly, and unlike previous elections, people without any educational qualifications were more 
likely to vote Conservative than Labour (by about 12 percentage points) whereas those with a 
university degree were more likely to vote Labour (by about 11 points). Although, historically, 
education was not as important as class in structuring vote choice in general elections, the 
relationship did tend to go in the same direction, with graduates being more likely to vote 
Conservative. Historically, the share of the vote for the Conservatives has been between three 
and ten percentage points higher among graduates than among those without a degree. This 
time it was eight points lower. 
We can get a clearer sense of how different groups voted by examining the impact of these 
different characteristics simultaneously, using a statistical technique called ‘logistic regression’. 
This technique allows us to examine the ‘independent’ impact of each variable on individual 
support for each of the two main parties while controlling for each of the other variables. For 
example, we know that people who went to university tend to end up with better-paid jobs than 
people who left school at 16. So, in Figure 2, part of what we observe as an effect of income may 
in fact be diluted by someone’s level of education. To get round this, we can examine both 
variables (and others) simultaneously. By examining education and income together, we can tell 
whether people with similar education levels but different levels of income differ in terms of their 
support for the two main parties.  
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Our results are presented in Table 3 (shown at the end of the report). When we consider age, 
sex and income together they suggest that people on low incomes were significantly more likely 
to vote Labour. There are also differences by ethnic background: people from black and minority 
ethnic communities and, in particular, ‘white other’ backgrounds were much less likely to vote 
Conservative than people from white British backgrounds. Older people were also much more 
likely to support the Conservatives than younger people. 
When studying these data, it is the effect of age that is particularly pronounced. We can 
illustrate this by calculating the ‘predicted probability’ of voting for the Conservatives or Labour 
for different groups, and while holding everything else constant.vii Support for the Conservatives 
was about 13 percentage points lower among those with a university degree than it was for 
people with GCSE qualifications or below, whereas support for Labour was four percentage 
points higher. With respect to income, support for the Conservatives was 20 percentage points 
higher among those on more than £60,000 than it was for those on less than £20,000 per year, 
whereas support for Labour was 20 points lower. Finally, and most strikingly, support for the 
Conservatives was nearly 30 percentage points higher among those aged 65 than it was for 
those aged under 30, whereas support for Labour was 23 points lower. 
In summary, whereas those on lower incomes were more likely to vote Labour than those on 
higher incomes, people with no or few qualifications were more likely to vote Conservative than 
those who have more qualifications. Our findings reveal that the pattern of support for Labour 
and the Conservatives in 2017 was somewhat different by age and education than it had been at 
previous elections, and also different to the patterns that we observed at the 2016 referendum. 
At the time of the vote for Brexit, we found much stronger education effects with both the 
highly educated and wealthy being more likely to vote to remain in the EU. By contrast the effect 
of class and income was not very different to what it had been in 2015 – though income, more 
so than class – continued to play an important role. 
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4 Poverty and place  
So far, we have explored the voting behaviour of people who are at risk of poverty because of 
individual characteristics, such as low incomes and few educational qualifications. Yet the risk of 
poverty is also shaped by the area in which people live, which underlines why it is important to 
examine the role of poverty from another angle. JRF has calculated an index of how the risk of 
working age poverty varies across England and Wales (details are available here).  
The Working Age Poverty Risk Index combines data on the receipt of out-of-work and in-work 
benefits to generate a ‘working age poverty risk score’ for each parliamentary constituency in 
Britain. High-risk scores mean a constituency has high levels of in- and/or out-of-work benefit 
receipt – two factors that are strongly associated with poverty. Low scores mean a constituency 
has lower levels on these indicators. The final risk score for a constituency varies between 0 and 
10, where 0 would be a constituency with both the lowest rate of in-work benefit receipt and 
the lowest rate of tax credit receipt and 10 would be a constituency with the highest rates on 
both indicators. In practice, because there is variation in where constituencies rank across the 
two indicators, the highest score is 8.5 (Bradford West) and the lowest score is 0.1 (Wimbledon). 
We can use these data to explore how the risk of working age poverty in an area influenced 
people’s voting behaviour across the country. To do this, we simultaneously examine the 
influence of people’s backgrounds, such as their personal income and level of education, as well 
as the characteristics of the area in which they live, such as whether they reside in a community 
that is at high risk of poverty. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3 at the end of 
the report, but we will summarize the findings here. 
People who live in areas with a high risk of poverty were more likely to vote for Labour than 
people who live in areas that are at low risk. Indeed, we find that after controlling for individual 
level attributes, the probability of voting Conservative varies from 48% in places with a very low 
risk of poverty (such as Wimbledon) to just 27% in places with a very high risk of poverty (such as 
Bradford West). These differences show that the type of place where people live and the risk of 
poverty in an area make a substantial difference to how they vote. 
In England and Wales both people on high and low incomes were much less likely to vote 
Conservative if they live in an area that is at high risk of poverty than an area which is at low risk 
of poverty. Indeed, the difference in Conservative support between people living in the most high 
risk and low risk poverty areas is just over 20 percentage points, which is about the same as the 
difference between people on high and low incomes (just under 20 percentage points). This 
underlines why the role of place, not only people, is important to understanding voting patterns. 
These two effects of poverty at the individual and community level combine to reveal striking 
differences. The probability of voting Conservative for someone who enjoys a high income and 
lives in a low risk poverty area is 62%, while the probability of someone on a low income in a high 
risk poverty area is just 23% - a difference of nearly 40 points. By contrast, the probability of 
voting Labour for someone on a low income in a high risk poverty area is 70%, whereas the 
probability of someone on a high income in a low risk poverty area is just 17% - a difference of 
over 50 points. 
People on low incomes living in an area with a low risk of poverty have a similar probability of 
voting Conservative as a person on a high income living in an area with a high risk of poverty. 
These results show that people’s political preferences are not only shaped by their own personal 
financial circumstances, but also by the surrounding conditions of the communities in which they 
live. Moreover, the effect of poverty is largely unaffected by the inclusion of other area-level 
variables, such as the education profile of the constituency, or the age or ethnic diversity profile 
of the constituency. These findings also hold if we examine the level of support for Brexit in the 
constituency. 
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5 Being pulled in different directions: austerity versus 
Brexit 
As we have seen, people on lower incomes tend to vote Labour while those on higher incomes 
tend to vote Conservative. This indicates that economic inequality continues to be an important 
influence on how people vote. Yet voters on low-incomes, and people who are either in, or at 
risk of, poverty, also face competing pressures. Whereas those with few qualifications tend to be 
more pro-Brexit and anti-immigration, which may draw them towards the Conservatives, people 
on lower incomes also tend to have more support for left-wing policies and favour economic 
redistribution, which may draw them toward Labour.  
These competing pressures were especially visible at the 2017 general election at which both 
Labour and the Conservatives sought to appeal to low income voters and those in poverty, albeit 
in quite different ways. While the Conservative Party mainly pitched to the identity concerns 
held by many lower income voters who had voted for Brexit, Labour mainly pitched to the 
economic concerns of these same social groups over austerity, inequality and falling living 
standards. Therefore, for people on lower incomes and who also often lack qualifications the 
2017 election provided a choice which pulled them in different directions. On one side, Labour 
pitched to their material interests and desire for economic fairness. On the other, the 
Conservatives pitched to their concerns over identity, their desire for reduced immigration and 
support for a ‘harder’ Brexit.  
How did people on low incomes and groups at risk of poverty navigate this choice? Faced with 
these competing appeals, did these groups split evenly between the two parties? Or did the anti-
austerity message resonate more with some groups of poor voters while the anti-immigration 
message resonated more with others?  
We can answer these questions by exploring voters’ political preferences. We start by 
considering the ‘Brexit Effect’ in shaping people’s voting patterns at the 2017 general election. 
At the time of the election, most voters ranked Brexit as the top issue facing Britain, with 57% 
identifying ‘leaving the EU’ as among the most important issues, well ahead of health (40%), 
immigration (36%) and the economy (27%). In fact, according to data compiled by YouGov Brexit 
had consistently been ranked as the top issue ever since the 2016 referendum.viii The 
importance of Brexit is also underlined by the British Election Study, which used an open-ended 
question to ask voters throughout the campaign to identify the single most important issue. 
Brexit dominated, with about one in three respondents using the word ‘Brexit’ when asked to 
identify the top issue.ix 
What do voters think about Brexit? Although there is still a great deal of uncertainty about what 
effect, if any, Brexit will have on Britain’s future, on balance a plurality of all respondents thought 
that Brexit would lower immigration: 47% said that Brexit would help to reduce immigration to 
the UK, compared to 6% who thought it might increase immigration (the rest didn’t know or 
thought immigration would stay the same). However, on balance people were also rather more 
likely to think that Brexit would be bad for the economy as well as bad for their own finances, 
and that Brexit will increase unemployment. People were relatively evenly divided on whether 
Brexit would help to boost international trade or not. There is thus broad acceptance that Brexit 
will be bad for jobs and the economy, but will nonetheless help to restrict immigration – a 
picture that is consistent with other research (Clarke et al, 2017). 
When asked about the trade-off between how people would like to see the Brexit negotiations 
develop, people are evenly divided about whether access to the single market or control of 
immigration should be prioritized: 39% place retaining access to the single market as a higher 
priority than restricting immigration, and 39% place restricting immigration as a higher priority 
than retaining access to the single market (the rest either didn’t know or would place both as an 
equal priority). There is also broad awareness that retaining access to the single market would 
involve continuing a financial contribution to the EU (47% said it would compared to 27% who 
said it wouldn’t) and accepting free movement (50% said it would compared to 24% who said it 
   
 
 
 
   15 
 
wouldn’t). On balance then, people have a broad awareness about the respective trade-offs 
involved. Even if people recognize that Brexit is likely to be bad for the economy and that 
controlling free movement is incompatible with retaining access to the single market – they are 
still relatively evenly divided about whether to push for a soft Brexit (retaining access to the 
single market) or a hard Brexit (prioritizing the control of immigration).  
How does support for these trade-offs relate to people’s political allegiances? As shown in Figure 
3 below, people who voted to remain in the EU were much more likely to vote Labour than 
Conservative (51% vs. 21%) whereas people who voted for Brexit were much more likely to vote 
Conservative than Labour (61% vs. 24%). Similarly, people who prioritize access to the single 
market were much more likely to vote Labour (52% vs. 19%), while people who prioritize 
restricting immigration were much more likely to vote Conservative (62% vs. 22%). 
Figure 3 Party support and attitudes towards Brexit 
 
Our earlier work with JRF revealed that support for Leaving the EU was strongly related to social 
values, and that people who held more socially conservative values were far more likely to vote 
Leave. However, there was not much of a relationship between supporting Leave and whether or 
not someone considered themselves to be on the left wing or right wing of the political 
spectrum. The 2016 referendum vote was structured more or less on a single value dimension, 
with more liberal-minded voters opting to Remain and more socially conservative or 
authoritarian voters opting to Leave. This helps to explain why there was significant support for 
Brexit in Labour-held areas as well as Conservative areas. But to what extent, if at all, did this 
hold true at the 2017 election? 
Voting at a general election is a more complicated affair than voting in a ‘remain-or-leave’ 
referendum. This is because there are far more cross-cutting pressures that might influence 
people’s voting, such as their feelings of loyalty to the parties, or the fact that a much broader 
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range of issues are being debated. So how did people’s values influence their vote choice at the 
general election that was held one year on from the referendum? 
We explore two distinct sets of values. Firstly, we examine whether people hold socially 
conservative or liberal views; which includes their attitudes towards things like the death penalty, 
censorship, and traditional values. Past research indicates that those who are socially 
conservative are more worried about immigration and want to reduce it. Secondly, we examine 
whether people hold right wing or left wing economic views; which includes their level of support 
for redistribution and their perception of the extent to which ordinary people get their fair share 
of the UK’s wealth.   
Figure 4 presents our results. People who hold more socially authoritarian attitudes, such as 
supporting the death penalty, were far more likely to vote Conservative than Labour (55% vs 
28%). By contrast, people who hold more economically left wing attitudes, such as favouring 
income redistribution, were much more likely to vote Labour than Conservative (57% vs 17%). 
So, whereas there is some evidence that socially conservative values still mattered, the role of 
traditional economic left-right values was far more important at the 2017 election than at the 
2016 referendum. 
Figure 4 Policy attitudes and political values 
 
How do these values relate to income? The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2 at the 
end of the report, but we will summarize the findings here. Support for right wing versus left 
wing economic policies are strongly influenced by income. Rich people are much more 
economically right wing than people on low incomes. There is a slight tendency for graduates to 
be more economically right wing than those with low qualifications, but the effect of education is 
much weaker than the effect of income. People from ethnic minority groups tend to be more 
economically left wing than white British people, women tend to be more right wing than men, 
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and people who are not in work tend to be more left wing than those who are in work. Thus, on 
balance, the groups most at risk of poverty still tend to hold more economically left wing 
attitudes and favour redistribution. Given the commitments made by Labour during the 
campaign, we may therefore expect these groups to be drawn towards Labour on economic 
policies. 
By contrast, a slightly different pattern emerges with respect to whether people hold socially 
liberal or authoritarian values – and whether people prioritize access to the single market or 
controlling immigration. Those with more socially conservative views were much more likely to 
support Leave, in large part because of worries about immigration, whilst those with more liberal 
views were more likely to support Remain.   
These attitudes are strongly influenced by education, and age. Graduates and the young tend to 
be much more liberal (and pro-soft Brexit) than people with low qualifications and the old, who 
tend to be more authoritarian (and pro-hard Brexit). There is some evidence that people on low 
incomes tend to be more authoritarian and pro-hard Brexit than those on high incomes, but the 
effect of income is generally much weaker than the effect of education (and age). There was 
some link between income and these views with those on low incomes more likely to have voted 
Leave and somewhat more likely to have socially conservative opinions. This meant that the 
Conservative Party’s focus on a ‘hard’ Brexit delivering lower immigration did attract some of 
these voters. 
People at risk of poverty – those on low incomes, not in work, and people with few qualifications 
- are therefore pulled in different directions. These groups tend to be more economically left 
wing, which may draw them towards Labour, but they also tend to hold socially authoritarian 
views and favour Brexit, which may draw them towards the Conservatives. However, it worth 
noting that the political preferences of groups at risk of poverty are not homogenous, and that 
whereas attitudes towards redistribution are strongly related to income, their attitudes towards 
Brexit are more strongly related to education.  
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6 Making a choice: austerity versus Brexit 
To explore these issues we can see how different values shaped voting patterns among those at 
risk of poverty by examining them in conjunction with the demographic variables that we have 
already considered. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3 at the end of the report, 
but we will summarize the findings here. Left-right economic values and attitudes towards Brexit 
had a strong impact on people’s 2017 vote choice, and in the expected direction. People with 
left wing economic views are much more likely to vote for Labour than the Conservatives. 
People who are pro-Brexit are much more likely to vote for the Conservatives than Labour. 
However, examining these different attitudes also sheds light on how groups at risk of poverty 
navigated the competing messages from the two major parties. When we add the Brexit variable 
into our model the effect of education all but disappears. This indicates that an important reason 
why graduates were more likely to vote Labour is because they were more anti-Brexit (and why 
people with low educational skills were more likely to vote Conservative is that they were more 
pro-Brexit). In addition, once attitudes towards Brexit are taken into account, the effect of 
income becomes somewhat stronger. This suggests that low income voters were attracted to the 
Conservative Party’s anti-immigration appeal, and that without it support for Labour would have 
been even higher.  
Finally, in the third model we examine the impact of left-right economic views. When we control 
for whether or not someone is economically left wing the effect of income is greatly reduced, 
indicating that an important reason why people on low incomes voted Labour is because they 
favoured redistribution and were attracted to Corbyn’s anti-austerity platform. This suggests that 
Labour’s appeal to lower income voters and its more economically populist message did appeal to 
these voters and was a powerful driver of Labour’s support.  
These models help to show how the political preferences of groups at risk of poverty influenced 
their vote choice. While the Conservative Party’s hard vision of Brexit may have attracted some 
voters on low incomes, Labour’s radical left wing anti-austerity vision attracted them much more. 
We can illustrate this by calculating the ‘predicted probability’ of voting for the Conservatives or 
Labour for people on low incomes with different political views, while holding everything else 
constant. Other things being equal, support for Labour among people on low incomes with left-
wing economic views was 66% compared to just 23% for the Conservatives – representing a 
Labour lead of over 40 percentage points.x By contrast, support for Labour among people on low 
incomes who are pro-Brexit was just 32% compared to 54% for the Conservatives – 
representing a Tory lead of 22 percentage points.xi This indicates that the effect of support for 
left wing economic views had a stronger impact on vote choice than the effect of pro-Brexit and 
anti-immigration views. Even though the Conservatives did well among the segment of the 
population on low incomes who were relatively pro-Brexit, Labour did even better among the 
segment who were relatively left wing. To have the best of both worlds people on low incomes 
would probably favour a party that offered them both redistribution and control of immigration, 
but given the choice on balance their preference for redistribution outweighed their preference 
for immigration control. 
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Conclusions and implications 
Elections are a time of frenzied speculation during the run up to the result and detailed post-
mortems in the aftermath, with every gain and loss scrutinized in minute detail. The focus of 
analysis and coverage is therefore often about change, and what tipped the balance one way or 
the other. However, focusing on these marginal changes often obscures the big picture and the 
important fault lines that run through society.  
 
Whereas the impact of poverty and deprivation was not a particularly novel feature of the 2017 
election – and in many respects was similar to the pattern in 2015 – it was nonetheless 
important. Britain is a deeply divided country, and the life chances of people vary enormously 
depending upon their own personal backgrounds and the areas in which they live. These divisions 
continue to be important, and the voting patterns of people on low incomes in deprived areas are 
very different to the political preferences of the well off in affluent areas. 
 
The election provided an opportunity for those who are struggling and marginalized sections of 
society to take centre stage. Somewhat unusually, both of Britain’s main parties made a pitch for 
their votes. On the one hand, the Conservatives made a bold play to appeal to the Brexit 
majority. On the other, Labour pitched to the material interests of those on low incomes.  
 
Our findings suggest that many of these voters who are struggling to get by, while they may 
agree with the vote for Brexit and calls to curb immigration, were more likely to vote for Labour 
because of their desire for economic redistribution and to endorse Labour’s anti-austerity 
platform. This suggests that Labour’s pitch to low income voters, and those in poverty, was a key 
driver of its performance at the 2017 election, but no political party made a major and clear 
breakthrough with these groups. While the Conservative vision of Brexit attracted some voters 
who are struggling to get by, Labour’s more radical anti-austerity vision tended to attract these 
voters even more. Both of the main parties, therefore, would be well advised to take the 
economic concerns of these key groups seriously and to keep them as much on the centre stage 
of British politics as possible. 
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Data behind the analysis 
Table 2:  Demographics and values, OLS regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Left-right scale Lib-Auth scale EU priority scale 
    
Age    
  Age 30 to 44 yrs -0.00 0.94*** 0.71*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
  Age 45 to 54 yrs -0.07 1.16*** 1.16*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
  Age 55 to 64 yrs -0.03 1.25*** 1.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
  Age 65 plus 0.32*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) 
Income    
  £20-39,000 0.30*** 0.01 -0.14** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
  £40-59,000 0.79*** -0.15** -0.41*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
  £60,000 plus 1.58*** -0.32*** -0.42*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
Education    
  A Level 0.18*** -0.71*** -0.98*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
  University 0.10*** -1.81*** -2.38*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
  White other -0.35*** -0.73*** -1.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
  BAME -0.38*** 0.56*** -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
  Female 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Work status    
  Student -0.12 -1.16*** -1.09*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) 
  Retired 0.00 0.03 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
  Not in work -0.50*** -0.19*** 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
  Constant 2.60*** 6.02*** 5.11*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
    
Observations 23,268 22,615 22,949 
R-squared 0.04 0.21 0.15 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference categories are age 18 
to 29 years old, income less than £20,000 per year, GCSE or below qualifications, white British, male, in 
work. 
The coefficients reported in the table refers to the unstandardized beta coefficients. Values marked with 
an asterisk indicate that there is a statistically ‘significant’ difference between the group in question and 
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the reference category, controlling for the other variables in the model. Values greater than zero indicate 
that the group in question tends to be more right wing (for example) than the reference group, holding 
all other factors constant; and values less than zero indicate that the group in question tends to be less 
right wing (for example) than the reference group, holding all other factors constant.  
 
Table 3:  Demographics, values and vote choice, Logistic regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Conservative Conservative Conservative
    
  Age 30 to 44 yrs 0.65*** 0.43*** 0.66*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) 
  Age 45 to 54 yrs 0.88*** 0.50*** 0.91*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) 
  Age 55 to 64 yrs 1.15*** 0.75*** 1.18*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) 
  Age 65 plus 1.61*** 1.27*** 1.62*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) 
  £20-39,000 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.10 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
  £40-59,000 0.45*** 0.65*** 0.30** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) 
  £60,000 plus 1.03*** 1.32*** 0.58*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) 
  A Level -0.05 0.17*** -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
  University -0.55*** -0.04 -0.26*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
  White other -0.76*** -0.49*** -0.37** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) 
  BAME -0.46*** -0.48*** -0.33** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) 
  Female -0.05 -0.11** -0.32*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
 Student -0.75*** -0.58*** -0.80*** 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.22) 
  Retired 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
  Not in work -0.47*** -0.53*** -0.20** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
  JRF poverty index -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
  EU priority scale  0.31*** 0.33*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Left-right scale   0.81*** 
   (0.02) 
Constant -0.24*** -1.71*** -4.52*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) 
    
Observations 14,108 12,830 12,063 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference categories are age 18 
to 29 years old, income less than £20,000 per year, GCSE or below qualifications, white British, male, in 
work. 
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The coefficients reported in the table refers to the log odds ratio. Values marked with an asterisk indicate 
that there is a statistically ‘significant’ difference in the likelihood of voting Conservative rather than 
Labour between the group in question and the reference category, controlling for the other variables in 
the model. Values greater than zero indicate that the group in question is more likely to vote 
Conservative than the reference group, holding all other factors constant; and values less than zero 
indicate that the group in question is less likely to vote Conservative than the reference group, holding all 
other factors constant.  
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Notes 
I. Nick Timothy, ‘If we want to win, Tories cannot be free-market fundamentalists’, The Telegraph, 
10 August 2017.  
II. Labour did not commit to ending a four-year freeze on working age benefits, which since 2015 
has disproportionately impacted people who struggle on low incomes. Despite opposing austerity, 
Labour actually only committed to reversing £2 billion of £9 billion in cuts, leaving the benefits 
freeze in place, and just as inflation was on the rise (Resolution Foundation, 2017).  
III. Seats that were estimated to have given majority support to Brexit and which also went from 
Conservative to Labour at the 2017 general election included High Peak, Weaver Vale, 
Warrington South, Keighley, Colne Valley, Croydon Central, Stockton South, Bury North, Crewe 
and Nantwich, Derby North, Vale of Clwyd, Ipswich, Bedford, Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport, 
Peterborough, Lincoln and Portsmouth South. 
IV. Fieldhouse, E, Green, J, Evans, G, Schmitt, H, van der Eijk, C, Mellon, J and Prosser, C (2017) 
British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 13. DOI: 10.15127/1.293723. 
V. Where the skill level of an area is based on the percentage of people in the constituency with a 
university degree. 
VI. Data on occupational background is currently only available for about half the sample, so these 
results may change when the coding is completed. 
VII. These estimates are based on multinomial logistic regression models. 
VIII. YouGov Political Tracker. Available online: 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/qsiscyspgx/YG%20Trackers
%20-%20Top%20Issues.pdf (accessed 18 August 2017). 
IX. British Election Study, ‘What was it all about? The 2017 election campaign in voters’ own words’, 
2 August 2017. Available online: http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-findings/what-was-it-
all-about-the-2017-election-campaign-in-voters-own-words/#.WZatXdPyuWg (accessed 18 
August 2017). 
X. We define people with left wing views as those who are one standard deviation to the left of the 
average position on the left-right scale for people with low incomes. 
XI. We define people as pro-Brexit who are one standard deviation away from the mean on the 
immigration-single market EU priority scale for people with low incomes. 
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